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In late March 2009, a five-year-old boy in La Gloria, Mexico
came down with the flu. This typically unremarkable event took
on significance when, two weeks later, over 800 people in nearby
Perote also became sick and the little boy was labeled "patient
zero" of the 2009-10 swine flu pandemic.2 Epidemiologists from
around the world converged on Perote Valley, as 60% of Perote's
citizens eventually fell ill.' tdgar Hernindez's mother sobbed to
the Washington Post reporter that her son could not have caused
this disaster.4 She and her neighbors blamed the hog factories.5
Perote, the capital of the state of Veracruz, is about 120 miles
from Mexico City. Surrounded by mountains on all sides, Perote
Valley is home to around 35,000 people and more than one million
pigs at any given time.6 Residents have long complained about
the hog factories. The odors from the massive manure cesspools
baking in the sun, some less than two miles from the city of Per-
ote, permeate their homes, clothes, and belongings. Dust clouds of
dried manure travel for miles, whipped up by the hot winds. It is
1. Assistant Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. The author thanks Nancy
Ehrenreich, Professor of Law & William M. Beaney Memorial Research Chair at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, and Beth Lyon, Professor of Law at
Villanova University School of Law, for including her in the Global Politics of Food:
Sustainability & Subordination conference.
2. CNN.com, Earliest Case of Swine Flu Tucked Away in Mexico, Officials Say
(May 1, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/04/28/swine.flu/index.html;
Joshua Partlow, Little Boy at the Center of a Viral Storm, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/28/AR2009042804041
.html.
3. Laura Carlsen, Mexico's Swine Flu and the Globalization of Disease,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carlsen/
mexicos-swine-flu-and-theb_193239.html.
4. Partlow, supra note 2.
5. Id.; CNN.com, supra note 2. There is credible evidence that the virus
developed in American hog farms in the 1990s. See Jon Cohen, Exclusive Interview:
CDC Head Virus Sleuth, SCIENCE MAG. (Apr. 29, 2009), available at http://news.
sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/04/exclusive-cdc-h.html.
6. Alexandra G. Ponette-Gonzalez & Matthew Fry, Pig Pandemic: Industrial Hog
Farming in Eastern Mexico, 27 LAND USE POL'Y 1107, 1108 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter
Ponette-Gonzdlez].
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difficult to breath. They are often sick.'
These are not traditional hog farms; these are the Granjas
Carroll de Mexico ("GCM") hog factories. They are the most pro-
ductive hog facilities in Mexico, owned in part by the world's larg-
est hog producer and packing corporation, Smithfield Foods.,
Many of the traditional commercial farms and backyard "camposi-
nos" have given up trying to compete with high-tech facilities like
these.' Although not a new problem, it took the swine flu
(rebranded "H1N1" by the hog industry) to attract the world's
attention."o
In the last twenty years, Mexican animal agriculture-breed-
ing, raising, and slaughtering pigs, cattle, and poultry (chickens
and turkeys)-has undergone a radical transformation that has
left the country with more meat but far fewer farmers. In many
ways, this transformation echoed the industrialization of agricul-
ture in the southern and mid-western United States in the late
1980s and the 1990s, with one critical distinction: in the U.S.
domestic corporations led the agriculture transformation. In Mex-
ico, the catalysts were primarily foreign-owned multinational cor-
porations, generally second-generation corporations connected to
the American agriculture "revolution." These industrial farming
corporations thrived in Mexico, and their success was simultane-
ously devastating to Mexican agriculture.
How did this happen? The answer lies in the trade liberaliza-
tion policies of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States in
7. Partlow, supra note 2; NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL & THE CLEAN
WATER NETWORK, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW FACTORY FARM LAGOONS
AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 1
(2001), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/cesspools/cesspools.pdf.
[hereinafter NRDC] ("People living close to hog operations have reported headaches,
runny noses, sore throats, excessive coughing, respiratory problems, nausea,
diarrhea, dizziness, burning eyes, depression, and fatigue.").
8. Ponette-Gonzdlez, supra note 6, at 1108. In this article, the words "hog," "pig,"
and "swine" will be used interchangeably. The word "sow" will only be used to refer to
female pigs, usually in the context of breeding. "Pork" will refer only to products
derived from pigs.
9. Batres Marques, et al., Midwest Agribusiness Trade Research & Info. Ctr.,
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF PORK TRADE, PRODUCTION, AND PROCESSING IN MEXICO,
at 11 (2006), http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PD FFiles/06mbp10.pdf
[hereinafter BATRES-MARQUEZ].
10. Reuters, U.S. Officials Want "Swine" Out of Flu Name, (Apr. 29, 2009), http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2009/04/29/uk-flu-usa-name-sb-idUKTRE53R7GJ20090429;
Emily Bryson York, Pork Industry Groups: Don't Call it Swine Flu, ADVERTISING AGE
(Apr. 29, 2009), available at http://adage.com/article?articleid=136337.
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1993." Using the Mexican hog industry, this article illustrates
how poorly-negotiated NAFTA provisions were manipulated to
exploit Mexican consumers, farm owners, and laborers. Part I dis-
cusses NAFTA's tariff rate quotas, and how they failed to protect
Mexican hog farmers. It explains how foreign owned corporations
were able to apply a two-sided strategy to take over more than
one-third of Mexican pork production while developing Mexico
into a leading importer of U.S. pork products. Part II briefly
reviews the primary arguments why industrial animal farms, col-
loquially called "CAFOs" (confined animal feeding operations) are
ultimately unsustainable without considerable government sup-
port. The section then provides explanation as to how the CAFO
model is even more unsustainable in emerging nations like Mex-
ico. In conclusion, the article provides a short discussion for the
reasons the U.S. pork lobby actively resists NAFTA reform.
PART I: NAFTA & THE MEXICAN HOG INDUSTRY
Prior to crafting the North American Free Trade Agreement,
the United States, Canada, and Mexico had become members of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and signatories to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the primary WTO
trade agreement. 2 GATT allows member nations to create "free
trade areas," such as the one created by NAFTA, by tailoring
trade guidelines in certain markets to further desired economic
policy." NAFTA was promoted as a vehicle to "reduce distortions
to trade" among the three neighbor countries, with "mutually
advantageous" trade rules.14 It entered into force on January 1,
1994.
In many respects, NAFTA has failed to deliver "mutually
advantageous" benefits.'" In the U.S., it is often criticized as the
catalyst for an exodus of manufacturing jobs to Mexico-the ful-
fillment of former presidential candidate Ross Perot's prediction
that NAFTA would create a "giant sucking sound" of companies
moving south.'6 In Mexico, NAFTA policies have had crippling
11. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11 (1947),
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
13. Id. at art. XXIV.
14. NAFTA, supra note 11, at Preamble.
15. Elisabeth Malkin, NAFTA's Promise, Unfulfilled, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/business/worldbusiness/24peso.html?_r=1.
16. Marla Dickerson, NAFTA Has Had its Trade-Offs for the U.S., L.A. TIMES
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effects on certain agricultural sectors. Within a decade, over 1.3
million Mexican agricultural jobs were lost; by 2008, another mil-
lion jobs disappeared." Partially to blame was emigration to the
U.S. by displaced Mexican agriculture laborers, which was at an
all-time high until the 2008 recession." Of those who remained,
many left their rural communities to seek alternative employment
in cities that were ill-prepared to accommodate such rapid popula-
tion growth.'" In 2009, the Carnegie Institute concluded that
NAFTA has left Mexico's "most vulnerable citizens ... facing a
maelstrom of change beyond their capacity, or that of their gov-
ernment, to control."20
The effect on the Mexican hog sector was manifest. Its supply
and demand balance were in flux, much of its labor force was ren-
dered unnecessary, and prices were depressed so low that tradi-
tional commercial farms began facing nearly insurmountable
odds. 2 1 Although Mexico had hoped that liberalized trade with the
U.S. and Canada would modernize its agriculture processes 22 and
increase production,2 3 NAFTA policies hastened the adoption of
(Mar. 08, 2008), httpi/articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/03/business/fi-nafta3 (noting the
"growing wariness" among U.S. voters that NAFTA has had inequitable results).
NAFTA is a model that, in our view, has utterly failed to deliver the
promised benefits to ordinary citizens in any of the three North
American countries. NAFTA's main outcome has been to
strengthen the clout and bargaining power of multinational
corporations, to limit the scope of governments to regulate in the
public interest and to force workers into more direct competition
with each other, reinforcing the downward pressure on their living
standards while assuring them fewer rights and protections.
Greg Woodhead, AFL-CIO Policy Statement: NAFTA's Seven Year Itch: Promised
Benefits Not Delivered to Workers, at 11 (2002), available at http://www.aflcio.org/
mediacenter/resources/upload/naftabenefitsnotdelivered.pdf
17. John J. Audley, et al., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, NAFTA's
Promise & Reality: Lessons from Mexico for the Hemisphere, 6 (2003), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1390
[hereinafter Carnegie Report I (reporting a job loss from 8.1 million to 6.8 million);
Global Development & Environment Institute, Tufts Univ. Policy Brief No. 10-01,
Hogging the Gains from Trade: The Real Winners from U.S. Trade & Agricultural
Policies, 3 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB10-
01HoggingGainsJan10.pdf [hereinafter Tufts Policy Briefi.
18. Carnegie Report, supra note 17, at 7.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
22. M. ANGELLES VILLARREAL, CONG. REs. SERv., RL34733, NAFTA AND THE
MEXICAN EcONOMY 12 (June, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL34733.pdf.
23. Sherman Robinson & Karen Thierfelder, The Effects of NAFTA in a Changing
Environment, Paper to the Tri-National Research Symposium, at 3 (Nov. 1996),
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industrialized practices at a pace too rapid to contain.' To appre-
ciate the impact of this accelerated industrialization, it helps to
consider how the CAFO model of hog production differs from the
pig farms these CAFOs replaced.
A. CAFO Hog Production: Commoditization Replaces
Husbandry25
1. Mass Confinement
The hallmark of CAFO production is mass confinement.
Rather than keeping animals in fields or feedlots, CAFO facilities
cage or pen animals individually or by the hundreds, inside enor-
mous warehouses clustered around exposed manure collection
tanks. The Smithfield GCM operation is typical: in 2008, GCM
had approximately 56,000 breeding sows and 950,000 hogs in pro-
duction for slaughter. The entire complex includes 16 facilities
spanning across the Perote Valley. Each facility has multiple
warehouse "units" dedicated to every step in the "farrow-to-finish-
ing" (birth-to-fattening) cycle, with each unit made up of as many
as 18 hog warehouses. 26 The warehouses are windowless, poorly-
ventilated, often sweltering, and the floor is typically slatted con-
crete designed to allow manure and urine to eventually drain
away.27 Because the commoditization formula anticipates that a
certain percentage of animals will fail to survive the warehouse
conditions, sick and injured animals are typically left untreated,
left to die.28
Breeding sows spend most of their lives immobile. After
available at http://agrinet.tamu.edu/trade/papers/burfishr.pdf (detailing several
Mexican government programs designed to increase productivity in agricultural
sectors).
24. Ponette-GonzAlez, supra note 6, at 1108.
25. Bernard E. Rollin, Farm Factories: The End of Animal Husbandry, in THE
CAFO READER, at 8-10 (Daniel Imhoff ed., 2010).
26. Ponette-Gonzdlez, supra note 6, at 1108.
27. Jeff Tietz, Boss Hog, in THE CAFO READER, supra note 25, at 110; The
Humane Society of the United States, An HSUS Report: The Welfare of Animals in
the Pig Industry, at 2-4 (May, 2010), available at http://www.humanesociety.org/
assets/pdfs/farm/welfare-pig-industry.pdf [hereinafter HSUS REPORT] (including an
extensive bibliography of research on the welfare conditions of CAFO hogs); Pew
Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, Putting Meat on the Table:
Industrial Farm Animal Production in America, at 33, 83, 85-87 (2008), available at
http://www.ncifap.org/ [hereinafter PEW REPORT] (identifying parallels between
animal welfare and public health risks).
28. Rollin, supra note 25 (suggesting that traditional notions of animal husbandry
are replaced with a commoditization paradigm that calculates an "acceptable"
percentage of loss due to animal death from illness or injury).
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being artificially inseminated, they are confined in "gestation
crates." Once the piglets are born, they are moved to equally con-
fining farrowing cages, where they are unable to nuzzle suckling
piglets or shift their bodies to avoid pain.29 Male pigs do not fare
much better, packed together in small pens, stressed to the point
of attacking each other or themselves. It is common practice to
"dock" (remove) the hogs' tails, without anesthesia, to prevent
other pigs from gnawing at them. 0 Moreover the enhanced feed-
ing and genetic manipulation practices discussed below often
result in body masses too large for their skeletons to support.31
2. Specialization & Vertical Integration
Unlike traditional farms, industrial facilities "specialize" in
certain segments of the hog production process. For example, a
CAFO breeding facility would engage in only the insemination
and gestation processes. After its piglets have been born and
weaned, they are sold to a farrowing facility for feeding, and so
on. 32 This model allows each facility to focus exclusively on
improving technologies and streamlining costs associated with its
specialty. 3
Complementing the specialization strategy is another essen-
tial trademark of industrial animal production: vertical integra-
tion. As first developed by Tyson Foods for the poultry industry,
this strategy involves either acquiring or establishing exclusive
contracts with a business provider for every part of the produc-
tion, processing, and sales chain (growing feed, breeding, birthing,
farrowing, slaughtering, packaging, transporting, marketing, and
selling).34 Smithfield announced its first fully-integrated opera-
29. Jeff Tietz, Boss Hog, in THE CAFO READER, supra note 25, at 110.
30. HSUS REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.
31. Donald E. Bixby, Old McDonald Had Diversity, in THE CAFO READER, supra
note 25, at 171, 173.
32. Marcy Lowe & Gary Gereffi, Center on Globalization Governance &
Competitiveness (CGGC), Duke Univ., A Value Chain Analysis of the U.S. Pork
Industry, at 9-10 (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.cggc.duke.edu/environment/
valuechainanalysis/CGGCPork%20IndustryReport_10-3-08.pdf [hereinafter CGGC].
33. USDA, EcoN. RES. SERV., THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF U.S. HOG
PRODUCTION REPORT 13 (Dec. 2007) available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
Publications/ERR52/ERR52.pdf [hereinafter USDA, ECON. RES. SERV.].
34. Batres-Marquez, supra note 9, at 11-13; Ponette-GonzAlez, supra note 6, at
1107-08. As an example, Smithfield Foods has acquired 20 companies since 1981.
Ctr. For Media & Democracy, Sourcewatch, Smithfield Foods, at 2, available at http://
www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SmithfieldFoods (reporting that the 2003
acquisition of Farmland Foods elevated Smithfield's,market share from 20% to 27%).
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tion in Mexico in 1999,35 and integration continues to be the
trend.36 Every member of an integrated operation benefits from
the competitive advantage of streamlined costs.37 The effects of
this business strategy were evident by 2003, when only 15% of the
domestically-produced pork for sale in Mexico came from smaller
commercial farms, while nearly 60% came from industrial facili-
ties with an average herd size of 300-1000 pigs.38
This expansion strategy was first used to great effect by Mur-
phy Family Farms, Carroll's Foods, and Prestage Farms, in Iowa,
North Carolina, Missouri, Minnesota, and Illinois. Such techno-
logically superior and vertically integrated systems ushered in a
new era of consolidated hog farming in the 1990s.3 1 Whereas
there were almost 3 million hog farms in the 1950s, today there
are only 67,000, with over 50% of pork producers in the U.S.
processing 5,000 or more pigs per year.40 Between 1992 and 2004,
the number of hogs processed in the U.S. remained steady, but the
number of hog farms dropped from 240,000 to only 70,000.41
3. Maximized Profits & Minimized Costs
CAFO operations are meticulously efficient. For example,
birth-to-slaughter production cycles are shorter than they are in
the traditional model, while the hogs are up to 20% heavier. This
is accomplished through the use of hormones, antibiotics, and
other pharmaceuticals to speed and enhance growth.42 Breeding
animals that are genetically manipulated or selected for traits
that deliver faster production also allows CAFO sows to produce
more piglets per litter (but fewer litters due to shorter life expec-
35. Smithfield Press Release, Smithfield Foods Announces Completion of Joint
Venture in Mexico, (Sept. 20, 1999), http://investors.smithfieldfoods.com/
releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=297149 (reporting Smithfield's $22 million investment for
half ownership of Agroindustrial Del Noroestehich, which had operations in
Hermosillo, Mexico City, and Guadalajara).
36. U.S. Meat Export Fed'n (USMEF), Mexico Pork, at 1 (Oct. 2008), http://www.
usmef.infolTradeLibrary/files/MEXICO%20PORK%20SMP%20FY09.pdf [hereinafter
USMEF].
37. Ponette-Gonzdlez, supra note 6, at 1107.
38. Id. (reporting that the remaining 28% of domestic pork consumed was
produced by backyard farms (10-50 pigs) which sold the fresh meat locally).
39. DAVID KIRBY, ANiMAL FACTORY, xvii, 24-25 (2011).
40. National Pork Producers Council, Pork Statistics, http://www.nppc.org/
aboutus/porkstatistics.htm.
41. CGGC, supra note 32, at 10.
42. HSUS REPORT, supra note 27, at 5-6.
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tancy).3 CAFOs thus enjoy lower feeding costs because they need
less feed for each production cycle and because they receive pre-
ferred pricing for high-volume purchases."
CAFOs also spend less on labor. Their average salaries are
lower, even for the more intensive or dangerous slaughtering and
packing positions. 45 The plentiful and desperate Mexican agra-
rian workforce, estimated at 2.3 million, has little choice but to
accept these low wages.46 Moreover, industrial operations hire
fewer laborers to run the breeding and feeding facilities. 47 Prior to
slaughter, pigs raised in industrial sites have little interaction
with humans. They do not need to be herded or moved from pas-
ture to barn. Feeding and waste management are mechanized or
built into the infrastructure. Labor needs are primarily in the
slaughter and packing stage of production.
B. How NAFTA Assisted the Hog Industry's Demise
To explain NAFTA's role in transforming the Mexican hog
industry, the next section describes how foreign interests
deflected measures taken to protect Mexico's live hog and pork
product industries. The following section describes the NAFTA
"Trojan horse" that allowed foreign corporations to also capture
the domestic Mexican markets. Together, these two trade and
expansion strategies put millions of commercial and subsistence
farmers out of business.
1. NAFTA's Feeble Defenses: Import Tariffs
The NAFTA-era takeover of Mexico's hog industry by foreign
corporations began with the treaty's anemic import tariff protec-
tions. Prior to 1985, Mexico protected its agricultural interests
from lower-priced imports through trade quotas. Pursuant to its
obligations under GATT, the government erected tariffs in place of
43. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 12; USDA, ECON. RES. SERV., supra note 33,
at 7.
44. CGGC, supra note 32, at 15-16.
45. BATREs-Marquez, supra note 9, at 5, 10. Seaboard Foods, for example,
transports bone-in hams from its Guymon, OK plant to the Reynosa Ham Deboning
Plant in Mexico. Seaboard Foods, HISTORY, http://www.seaboardfoods.com/about-
history/Index.htm.
46. Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17, at 3-4. In large part, this exodus was
prompted by the severe drop in Mexican corn and soybean crop prices, caused by
increased imports of U.S.-grown crops. American slaughter and packing plants hire
many of these displaced laborers. Id. (estimating that a quarter of U.S. animal
processing plants are operated by undocumented workers).
47. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 14, tbl.2.
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the quotas.' Most of these tariffs were scheduled to expire on the
day NAFTA came into force. However, all three countries negoti-
ated to maintain tariffs for certain products allowing them to be
reduced incrementally over time."9 The import tariff reduction
schedule for pork products and live hogs provided for reductions in
ten equal increments, over nine years, with a final elimination of
duties on January 1, 2003.0 These customs barriers were sup-
posed to protect the Mexican pork industry from being undercut
by less-expensive pork imports from the U.S. and Canada."
The protective tariffs proved inadequate, at least in Mexico.
Live hog imports from the U.S. increased an incredible 10,000-fold
between 1997 and 1998 alone.5 2 Anti-dumping tariffs initiated by
Mexico temporarily slowed the influx of live hogs, but by 2003, the
import-export balance again decidedly favored U.S. producers.
Imports of U.S. pork products also skyrocketed-up almost 260%
by the end of the NAFTA's first decade; during the same period,
domestic production of pork products rose by only approximately
30%."1 By the late 2000s, the overall increase in imports from the
U.S. was 700%6" and today, Mexico is the second largest importer
of American pork products."
2. NAFTA's Trojan Horse: Cheap Animal Feed
The profusion of hog and pork imports into Mexico was prob-
lematic, but it was not the gravest danger to the Mexican hog
industry. The true threat to the domestic industry came from
multinational corporations investing heavily in business ventures
with Mexico's largest hog producers, or purchasing them outright.
Their efforts were facilitated by Mexico's newly relaxed land own-
ership regulations56 and minimized restrictions on foreign
investments."
48. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, et al., NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS &
CHALLENGES 295 (2005), available at http://gesd.free.fr/nafta05.pdf; Sherman
Robinson & Karen Thierfelder, The Effects of NAFTA in a Changing Environment, at
1 (Nov. 1996), http://agrinet.tamu.edu/trade/papers/burfishr.pdf.
49. HUFBAUER, supra note 48, at 283.
50. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Annex 703.3(B), Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 377, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/naftal
naftatce.asp.
51. HUFBAUER, supra note 48, at 284-85 (including a schedule for NAFTA tariffs).
52. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 10, fig. 9.
53. Carnegie Report, supra note 17, at 70, tbl.1.
54. Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
55. USMEF, supra note 36, at 1.
56. HUFBAUER, supra note 48, at 295.
57. Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17, at 3. Mexico lifted its prohibition on 100%
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Corporations like Smithfield Foods and ConAgra Foods"
could now compete with Mexican commercial hog farms." They
were able to undercut this competition in large part by exploiting
NAFTA's open trade initiatives to reduce their biggest operation
cost, animal feed. This feed, typically corn and soybeans, was con-
siderably less expensive in the U.S., and NAFTA essentially cre-
ated "implicit subsidies" for U.S.-owned corporations importing
cheap and tariff-free animal feed into Mexico."o Meanwhile, other
Mexican farms paid higher prices for domestically-grown soy-
beans and corn." Although NAFTA's tariff provisions were meant
to protect against just this type of trade imbalance, the Mexican
government scantly resisted the imbalance during the first years
of the treaty, when imports of U.S. feed corn and soybeans jumped
by 500% and 150%, respectively.6 2
In addition, the 1996 U.S. Farm Bill, which deregulated the
agricultural commodities markets, exacerbated the trade imbal-
ance by benefitting these large-volume purchasers of animal feed
crops.3 Deregulation allowed supplies to far exceed demand,
depressing the purchase prices of U.S. corn and soybeans at 23%
and 15% below the cost of production.' This price depression
lasted for almost a decade, during which the same commodities
were almost twice as expensive in Mexico, even for high-volume
industrial purchasers.65 U.S. and Mexican government subsidy
programs for animal feed commodities 6  were critical to ensuring
foreign-ownership of domestic business operations and discontinued its requirement
that foreign-owned businesses to conduct operations in consideration of local
economies. Id.
58. Monte W. Fuhrman, DVM, Hog Heaven: Is it on the Yucatan Peninsula of
Mexico?, 4 Swine HEALTH & PROD. 41, 41 (1996), available at http://www.aasv.org/
shap/issues/v4n11v4n1p41.pdf (describing the ConAgra USA venture with a Mexican
producer to create a vertically-integrated facility for breeding and producing a target
of 30,000 hogs at a time).
59. Ginger Thompson, NAFTA to Open Floodgates, Engulfing Rural Mexico, N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 19, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/19/internationallamericas/
19NAFT.html.
60. Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17, at 2.
61. Id. at 1.
62. Id. at 2-3.
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id.
65. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 14.
66. The Mexican government established several programs in anticipation of
adopting NAFTA. The Program of Direct Support for the Countryside (Programa de
Apoyos Directos para el Campo, or PROCAMPO) was announced in 1993 as a "direct
income transfer program" designed to replace Mexico's price support program during
the first fifteen years of NAFTA implementation. The 1994 Mexican peso crisis
contributed to a decline in PROCAMPO support for farmers (down $1.4 billion in 1994
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the viability of the industrial animal agriculture business model,
which required a favoring of large-volume purchasers over tradi-
tional farms or smaller subsistence farmers.6 1 Indeed, once bene-
fited the companies would attempt to further leverage their
advantage. Evidencing this, the largest U.S. hog production and
pork processing corporations, Smithfield and Tyson, are also the
top-five feed production corporations, further augmenting their
competitive advantage over Mexican competitors.'
Thus, while inexpensive live hog and pork product imports
from the U.S. were already a significant threat to the Mexican
industry, the fatal blow arguably came from multinational corpo-
rations based in Mexico, which used NAFTA's open trade avenues
to import the commodity most critical to beating their competi-
tion, low cost animal feed.
3. Rising Consumption Rates & Dropping Prices
Once they had minimized feed and labor costs, and created
vertically integrated business agreements, transnational corpora-
tions were able to infuse the Mexican market with pork products
priced so low that farms not operating on an industrial scale were
unable to compete. Pork prices dropped, in real terms, 56%
between 1997 and 2005.9 The consequence of these lower prices
was a rise in consumption of pork products-up 20% between
1995 and 2002." Prices continued to drop, consumption continued
to rise, and domestic farms continued to close, as NAFTA tariffs
on pork and live hog imports became incrementally ineffective
each year. It was predicted that the end of the tariff program
would lead to a further one-third reduction of Mexico's remaining
18,000 hog farms."
This prediction proved accurate. In the year following the
January 2003 expiration of hog and pork tariff provisions, imports
of U.S. pork products increased a dramatic 67%, while exports
from Mexico to the U.S. rose by only a fraction of that percent-
to $1 billion in 1998). The Alliance for the Countryside program (Alianza para el
Campo) was developed two years later to help finance modernization projects.
HUFBAUER, supra note 48, at 295-96.
67. HUFBAUER, supra note 48, at 295 n. 26; Hugh Dellios, 10 Years Later: NAFTA
Harvests a Stunted Crop, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 14, 2003), at Al, available at http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-12-14/news/0312140458_1_nafta-rural-mexicans-
president-vicente-fox.
68. CGGC, supra note 32, at 30-32, tb1s. 9-11.
69. Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
70. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 2.
71. HUFBAUER, supra note 48, at 289 n.10.
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age. 72 Between 2007 and 2008, U.S. pork imports rose another
40%.7" Today, half of the pork consumed in Mexico comes from the
U.S., 74 and more than one-third of the domestic Mexican pork
industry is owned and operated by transnational industrial opera-
tions. It is estimated that Smithfield owns half of that share.5
The expanding gap between the consumer consumption rate
and the domestic production rate, at 30% by the early 2000s, sug-
gests continued and growing reliance on U.S. imports.76 Smith-
field and its competitors assert that the increased consumption of
imported pork proves that Mexican consumers demand high-yield,
mechanized farming practices, and that they find pork products
from backyard farm pigs inferior. Still, the industrialized model
has substantial disadvantages, many of which are more pro-
nounced in "developing" nations like Mexico.
PART II: UNSUSTAINABLE PRACTICES IN THE
RACE TO THE BorTom
Modern production technologies discussed here yield inexpen-
sive food. Americans today spend less of their income on food than
they did fifty years ago." However, the CAFO production model
inherently gives rise to costly environmental and public health
effects, and it relies on a governmental subsidy support. In the
U.S., increasingly strict environmental standards and growing
media scrutiny over labor and animal welfare conditions have
impeded further domestic expansion. As early as the mid-1990s,
leaders like Smithfield, Tyson, Iowa Beef Processors (IBP), and
Cargill began developing expansion plans in Latin America, East-
72. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 3.
73. Western Organization of Resource Councils, et al., Press Release, Livestock
Producers from Mexico, Canada and United States Seek New Trade Policy & Market
Reforms (Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.orgheadlines.cfm?
refid=105233.
74. Id.
75. Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
76. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 2.
77. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 10, 13.
78. Bryan Walsh, Getting Real About the High Price of Cheap Food, TIME MAG.,
Aug. 21, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1917458,
O0.html (citing USDA statistics that "Americans spend less than 10% of their incomes
on food, down from 18% in 1966").
79. See, e.g., Daniel Imhoff, supra note 25, at 63--65; DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTs, CAFOs UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF
CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONs 4 (2008), http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/
documents/food and agriculture/cafos-uncovered.pdf.
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ern Europe, China, and India.8 0 A brief review of the CAFO
model's primary external effects illustrates why these locales were
preferable.
A. General Sustainability Issues
1. Animal Waste Management
A natural consequence of the mass confinement of animals is
an unmanageable accumulation of animal waste. Typically, this
waste is collected and stored on-site, in uncovered, outdoor
"lagoons" spanning at least several acres.8' The waste matter is
plentiful and toxic; it takes only 2,500 pigs to generate about 48
million gallons of liquid waste, sludge, and slurry a year, and the
waste is 10 to 100 times more pathogenic than human waste."
Whereas U.S. federal and state agencies heavily regulate the
management of human waste products, they have been slow to
address agricultural waste."
The inability to adequately contain or dispose of these by-
products can have dire results. Groundwater and surface waters
become contaminated with harmful pathogens like escherichia
coli (E. coli), giardia, and salmonella," and toxic materials such as
ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, cyanide, phosphates, nitrates, and
80. Doreen Carvajal & Stephen Castle, A U.S. Hog Giant Transforms Eastern
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at 1B, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
05/06/business/global/06smithfield.html; Dirk Johnson, Pork Producer Settles Suit as
Pollution Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com1999/08/
16/us/pork-producer-settles-suit-as-pollution-rules-tighten.html.
81. PUBLIC CITIZEN, SMITHFIELD FOODS: A CORPORATE PROFILE 5 (2004), available
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Smithfield.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN].
82. Id. at 5; Jeff Tietz, Boss Hog, in THE CAFO READER, supra note 25, at 109
(noting that hogs create three times more fecal waste than humans).
83. Id. at 5.
84. The scope of the Environmental Protection Agency's authority to regulate
CAFOs under the Clean Water Act is unresolved. See, e.g., Nat'l Pork Producers
Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 750-51 (5th Cir. 2011) (ruling that the EPA exceeded
its statutory authority in requiring CAFOs to apply for a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the "potential to discharge"
theory). In January, 2011, the EPA issued the results of a two-year study on air
emissions from CAFO operations. Press Release, EPA, Emissions Data From Animal
Feeding Operations Study Now Available, (Jan. 13, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/
opa/admpress.nsf/-d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/dcl3b657ff6203ce85257817
005ed001!OpenDocument.
85. PEw REPORT, supra note 27, at 13, 15; see generally, EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE
ELIMINATION SYSTEM REGULATION AND THE EFFLUENT GUIDELINES FOR CONCENTRATED
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 3-1 (2001), available at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/
wastetech/guide/cafo/upload/2001_02_13.guidecafo CAFOBenefits.pdf [hereinafter
EPA NPDESI.
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other heavy metals.8 6 Algae blooms and fish kills often result
when manure leaks into public drinking, swimming, or fishing
water bodies." A common practice of CAFO facilities is to attempt
to dispose of manure by spraying it, as fertilizer, on local fruit and
vegetable crops ("sprayfields"). This practice extends the risk of
pathogenic contamination to consumers of these crops," and when
the fields become oversaturated, the runoff further broadens the
risk of contagion."
2. Antibiotic Overuse & Genetic Uniformity
CAFO hog waste also contains traces of the hormones, insecti-
cides, antibiotics, and other drugs used to offset the inevitable
consequence that arise when raising animals in confined quarters
with higher risk of disease, infection, and infestation." Poor ven-
tilation and waste drainage systems promote the growth of bacte-
ria and viruses, which move freely from one animal to the next.9'
To make matters worse, these animals already have compromised
immune systems, due to the stress of confinement and inability to
engage in normal behavior, and to the breeding practices
described below.92
Antibiotics are also widely used to speed growth." These pro-
phylactic dosing practices in the U.S. have been scrutinized more
closely since the FDA reported that in 2009, 28.8 million pounds of
antimicrobial drugs were sold and distributed exclusively for farm
86. PEW REPORT, supra note 27, at 13, 15.
87. Ponette-Gonzdlez, supra note 6, at 1109.
88. EPA NPDES, supra note 85, at 2-3; Wenonah Hauter, Nuclear Meat: Using
Radiation and Chemicals to Make Food "Safe" in THE CAFO READER, supra note 25,
at 294.
89. Daniel Imhoff, Introduction, in THE CAFO READER, supra note 25, at xv. The
hog/owner-facility/contractor model for farm facility ownership allows companies like
Smithfield to be unaccountable for damage caused by waste runoff, because the
contractors who own the land and facility sign an agreement with the hog owner to
this effect. The contractor thus "owns the waste product to be sold as fertilizer,...
permitting the [hog owners] to point the finger at the contractors if any pollution
results from lagoon leakage or overspraying." PUBLIc CITIZEN, supra note 81, at 5.
90. Jeff Tietz, Boss Hog, in THE CAFO READER, supra note 25, at 111; Gardiner
Harris, Antibiotics in Animals Needs Limits, F.D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES, (June 28,
2010), at Al5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/health/policy/29fda.
html; NRDC, supra note 7, at 21.
91. E Coli, present in cattle feces, is transmitted from one cattle to another when
they attempt to groom one another. See P. McGee, et al., Horizontal Transmission of
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 during Cattle Housing, 67 J. FOOD PROTECTION 2651, 2655
(2004).
92. PEw REPORT, supra note 27, at 13.
93. Id. at 15.
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animal use;' this is nearly 80% of all such drugs sold in the U.S.
that year." Antibiotic overuse is considered a factor in the emer-
gence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria such as Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA).96 The industry dismisses the
FDA's concerns as lacking scientific credibility."
Modern breeding practices, designed to produce consistency
and predictability in pork products, also weaken the animals'
immune systems. Forced genetic uniformity and over-selection of
certain high-yield traits eliminate the natural development of
resistances to pathogens and viruses." Thus, according to some
epidemiologists, a compelling connection exists between CAFO
conditions and the rapid rise of pandemics such as avian flu and
the swine flu that arose in Perote, Veracruz in 2010.9
3. Inadequate Regulation of Animal Feed
Finally, animal feed is mostly unregulated in both the U.S.
and Mexico. Despite the already low and often subsidized prices
enjoyed by industrial purchasers of feed corn and soybeans, feed is
commonly supplemented with animal carcasses, a process called
"rendering." Although cattle may no longer be rendered for cattle
feed, due to its association with Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE or "mad cow disease"),10 rendered cattle
may be used in hog feed, and rendered hogs in cattle feed. It is
also not uncommon for CAFO animal feed to include rendered car-
casses of shelter animals (dogs and cats), and inorganic or indi-
gestible materials such as plastic and feathers. 0'
94. FDA, CmR. FOR VETERINARY MEDICINE, SUMMARY REPORT ON ANTIMICROBIALS
SOLD OR DISTRIBUTED FOR USE IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALs (2009), http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/AnimalDrugUserFeeActADUFAUCM231851.
pdf.
95. Ralph Loglisci, New FDA Numbers Reveal Food Animals Consume Lion's
Share of Antibiotics, CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE, Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.livable
futureblog.com/2010/12/new-fda-numbers-reveal-food-animals-consume-lion%E2%80
%99s-share-of-antibiotics/.
96. PEW REPORT, supra note 27, at 21.
97. See, e.g., National Pork Producers Council, Press Release, Where's Science
Behind FDA Antibiotics "Guidance"?, June 28, 2010, http://www.nppc.org/News/
PressRelease.aspx?DocumentlD=25859.
98. Bixby, supra note 31, at 173 (recalling the "old adage warn[ing] against
putting all your eggs in one basket").
99. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Spread of Superbugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/-opinion/07kristof.html; supra text accompanying note
7.
100. Michael Pollan, Power Steer, in THE CAFO READER, supra note 25, at 98.
101. Id. at 98-99; see also HSUS REPORT, supra note 27, at 5-6 (discussing ulcers in
hogs).
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B. Sustainability Issues Specific to Mexico
Mexico's plentiful workforce and relaxed environmental and
public health regulations, coupled with NAFTA pro-trade policies,
offered Smithfield the ideal location to launch the corporation's
global growth strategy.10 2 However, the same conditions that
accommodated the adoption of industrial agriculture practices cre-
ated additional public health and environmental problems specific
to Mexico's environment, geography, and culture.
1. Obesity & Access to Clean Drinking Water
As discussed, when the cost of pork products fell, consumption
rose precipitously (as was the case with similar foods high in pro-
tein and fat). This contributed to a dramatic rise in obesity rates
and a health crisis with which Mexico's healthcare system is
unequipped to manage. To illustrate, in the late 1980s, less than
10% of Mexican adults were considered overweight. By 2008,
close to 71% of women and 60% of men were overweight, 10 3 and
nearly a quarter of the adult population was considered obese.
Diabetes has since become the leading cause of death 04 and Mex-
ico has the dubious honor of joining the "developed" countries that
top the list of "fattest nations."10
Industrial agriculture has also contributed to the obesity
problem by threatening the already inadequate supply of drinking
water. As an example, the water table of the Perote-Zalayeta
aquifer in Perote Valley appears to have been declining sharply
since 1994, GCM's first year of operation."0o CAFOs require enor-
mous quantities of water to operate, especially in the feeding
stage. It is estimated that creating one pound of industrially-
raised pork chops takes 576 gallons of water.'o
The American soda industry has capitalized on the shortage
102. Smithfield Foods Press Release, Smithfield Foods, Inc. Forms Vertically
Integrated Pork Processing Joint Venture in Mexico, May 12, 1999, http://investors.
smithfieldfoods.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=297159.
103. Franco Ordonez, Mexico is the Second Fattest Nation After U.S., SAN DIEGO
TRIB., March 24, 2008, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/
20080324/news ln24obese.html.
104. Id.
105. Sins of the Fleshy, THE EcoNoMisT, Dec. 16, 2004, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/3507918?StoryID=3507918; Catherine Rampell, The World is
Fat, N.Y. TIMEs BLOG, THE ECoNOMIX, Sept. 23, 2010, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/09/23/the-world-is-fat/.
106. Ponette-GonzAlez, supra note 6, at 1109.
107. This figure includes the amount of water used to grow the necessary amount of
animal feed. See CNBC.com, Tracking Your Water Footprint, http://www.cnbc.com/id/
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of potable water in Mexico. Sugary soda drinks are almost ubiqui-
tous, often offered as a "substitute" to water in public and private
schools.'0 Mexico is a leading U.S. soda export market, and Mexi-
cans consume more carbonated soft drinks, per capita, than any
other population.'" The 40% increase in childhood obesity since
2000110 prompted the Mexican government to recently ban the sale
of sodas, sugary fruit drinks, and other "junk food" in primary and
secondary schools."'
2. Weaker Environmental & Public Health Standards
Compared to Mexico, the U.S. is less accommodating to indus-
trial agriculture. The American agriculture lobby successfully
advocated self-regulation for decades,1 12 but the federal govern-
ment, joined by some state legislatures, has finally begun to hold
the industry accountable for environmental damages," and the
U.S. Department of Justice is investigating alleged anti-trust vio-
lations.'14 In addition, some citizens have been successful in nui-
39156898/ There s_HowMuch_ WaterInMy_ Hamburger?slide=14 (last visited
October 7, 2011).
108. Ordenez, supra note 103 (citing a 2008 study conducted by the National
Institute of Public Health).
109. USDA, FOREIGN AGRIC. SERv., GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION NETWORK
REPORT: THE MEXICAN MARKET FOR SoFr DRINKS 2 (Aug. 20, 2009), http://static.
globaltrade.net/files/pdfl20091222064601.pdf.
110. Ordenez, supra note 103.
111. Jo Tuckman, Mexico Bans Junk Food in Schools, GUARDIAN UK, May 27, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/27/mexico-bans-junk-food-schools.
112. KIRBY, supra note 39, at 300 (crediting Tyson Foods' influence in the EPA's
decision to grant large CAFOs amnesty from Clean Air Act rules); see also David J.
Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 205-06 (Cass Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum eds.,
2004) (describing how lobbying at the state level redefined anti-cruelty laws so that
"standard [agriculture] industry practices" were exempted). The hog industry has
argued for voluntary reform, but been slow to adopt actual reforms. The FDA's
appeal that animal food producers curtail their use of prophylactic pharmaceuticals
was met with tepid, defensive responses. Similarly, the industry's stance on adopting
more humane animal welfare practices has, for the most part, been limited to public
relations opportunities. For instance, Smithfield announced in 2009 that it would
begin phasing out gestation crates for breeding sows (a practice considered by many
to be one of the most inhumane) and substitute group housing alternatives by 2015.
It has since reneged on this well-publicized promise, on the grounds that it would be
prohibitively expensive. The HSUS, HSUS Exposes Inhumane Treatment of Pigs at
Smithfield (Dec. 2010), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/ press releases/2010/12/
smithfield.pigs_ 121510.html (noting that Smithfield competitors Maxwell Foods and
Cargill are 100% and 50% crate-free, respectively).
113. United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 1999)
(affirming summary judgment for the government, which alleged Clean Water Act
violations amounting to over $10 million in civil fines)
114. William Neuman, Justice Department Tells Farmers It Will Press Agriculture
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sance suit claims against neighboring CAFOs."5
The Mexican government has been able to do little to regulate
the expansion of industrial farming, and federal water pollution
laws are ineffective at protecting ground and surface water from
point source or runoff contamination."' When fines are levied,
they are too inconsequential to deter repeat behavior, demonstrat-
ing the general lack of political will to manage the industry."' As
in the U.S., those with the most incentive to regulate CAFO facili-
ties lack the political power to do so.
This is because industrial farms are often purposely sited in
poorer communities, where politically disenfranchised residents
will work for lower wages and under worse conditions."' Those
living within several miles of a CAFO typically suffer physical and
mental ailments caused by the toxins in the air and water: respir-
atory and gastrointestinal problems, skin and eye irritations,
headaches, and depression." 9 With no civil tort options for rem-
edy, they rely entirely on the government to protect their health.
Perote Valley residents, some living less than 1.5 miles from a
GCM hog feeding facility, waited two years for environmental
inspectors to respond to complaints that the factories were mak-
ing them ill. Inspectors found "several issues of concern" yet
issued no fines.120
This is only a brief introduction to how weak government
oversight of industrialized farming has compromised the health
and well-being of Mexican agrarian and urban populations. How-
ever, if Mexico attempts to reform NAFTA to correct trade imbal-
ances, or to address the environmental, public health, or labor
Industry on Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/03/13/business/13seed.html.
115. Sylvia Hsieh, Litigation Against Factory Farms Finds New Momentum,
Lawyers USA, Sept. 13, 2010, available at http://www.potts-law.com/2OlO/news/138-
sept-13-2010) (reporting on two successful Missouri nuisance suits, in 2006 and 2010,
which have prompted similar filings in Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North
Carolina, Oklahoma and West Virginia).
116. Ponette-Gonzdlez, supra note 6, at 1109.
117. Id.
118. BATRES-MARQUEZ, supra note 9, at 5; see also Tufts Policy Brief, supra note 17,
at 1; Mike Ely & Linda Flores, Strike at Smithfield: Workers Under a Changing Sky,
REVOLUTIONARY WORKER #76, (Jan. 2007), http://revcom.us/a/076/smithfield-en.html;
Landing in Storm Lake: Immigrant Meatpackers in the Heartland, REVOLUTIONARY
WORKER #920, Aug. 17, 1997, http://revcom.us/a/v19/920-29/920/storm.htm.
119. Ponette-Gonzdlez, supra note 6, at 1109 (noting that communities within 2 km
of a typical-sized industrial hog operation are exposed to ammonia levels greater than
forty times an acceptable, or "ambient," level).
120. Id.
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concerns mentioned here, it should expect considerable resistance
from the powerful U.S. hog industry.
CC. Why the American Pork Lobby Resists NAFTA
Reform
Although NAFTA has many critics, the major hog producers
and packers are not among them.12 ' The U.S. National Pork Pro-
ducers Council, which lobbied ambitiously for NAFTA's ratifica-
tion, credits NAFTA policies for transforming a formerly
"inconsequential market" to one with an export value at over $762
million, reflecting a 580% rise in U.S. pork exports since 1993.122
However, the industry's desire to sustain this market is not the
only reason it supports NAFTA in its current form.
Consider this scenario: A common complaint about NAFTA is
that it does not impose uniform environmental restrictions;
instead, it requires adherence to the "host" nation's regulations.
As discussed, Mexican environmental regulations are compara-
tively permissive. It is argued that the prospect of incurring fewer
environmental management costs encourages U.S. manufacturers
to relocate to Mexico.123 If the U.S. proposes that Mexico
strengthen its environmental regulations vis-b-vis the U.S. and
Canada, or requests any other meaningful concession, Mexico will
be in a position to insist on concessions in the animal agriculture
realm.
This, in turn, would necessarily involve a discussion about
CAFO practices. U.S.-owned corporations would prefer to avoid
such a public debate, as they are already concerned about how the
developing Mexican retail sector perceives their products.' They
see two related obstacles to establishing and growing brand loy-
alty for their industrially raised pork: lack of awareness about
their products' reliability and consistency, and what they charac-
terize as the "dissemina[tion of] false information in the media
121. See, e.g., Malkin, supra note 15; Carnegie Report, supra note 17, at 6-7; Sierra
Club, NAFTA's Impact on Mexico, http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/downloads/nafta-
and-mexico.pdf.
122. National Pork Producers Council, Mexican Trucking, (2008) http://nppc.org/
issues/mexicantrucking.htm.
123. Ponette-Gonzdlez, supra note 6, at 1109.
124. USMEF, supra note 36, at 1-2 ("There is limited presence of U.S. pork in
regional supermarket chains; notably in areas where pork is a popular protein
source.").
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about the quality and safety of U.S. pork entering the market."125
Thus, NAFTA reform negotiations about prophylactic antibiotic
use, or animal confinement practices, would compromise the mes-
sage that industrially-raised pork products are superior.12 6
U.S. hog and pork producers also wish to influence U.S. trade
policies on the other side of the equation, by lobbying for trade
restrictions on pork imports from Mexico. One avenue for limiting
Mexican pork imports is the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Agreement, which allows WTO member nations to restrict
imports for reasons having to do with human health or animal
health. The restriction must be based on "sufficient scientific evi-
dence. "127 Although beyond the scope of this article, some SPS
pork import requirements could be prohibitively difficult for
smaller-scale Mexican hog or pork producers to fulfill; these
include enhanced testing processes or controls to prevent the
spread of swine diseases; 128 mor stringent hygiene and inspection
processes for slaughter facilities; or stricter packaging and trans-
portation safeguards.
Another trade barrier option is the Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) Agreement, which could be used to require that
imported products meet certain labeling guidelines, for instance.
The guidelines must be "necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective,
taking account of the risks" of not fulfilling the objective.129 An
example of this is the U.S. Country of Origin Labeling Act
(COOL), which requires many unprocessed food imports to bear a
label indicating, in English, its origin. Mexico has challenged this
trade barrier as a violation of TBT and other trade agreements."'o
Importantly, as the U.S. Meat Export Federation has reported,
two can play this game; Mexico has also threatened to impose
trade restrictions pursuant to these agreements.'
125. USMEF, supra note 36, at 1 (It is unclear whether the media discussed is
American, Mexican, or both).
126. USMEF, supra note 36, at 2.
127. WTO, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493; BATES-MARQUEz, supra note 9, at 7.
128. Press Release, National Pork Producers Council, NPPC Urges USDA to Make
Review of Mexican Pork Industry a Top Priority, Oct. 24, 2008, available at http://
nppc.org/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=23898.
129. WTO, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
3.
130. WTO, Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States-Certain Country of
Origin Labeling Requirements, (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/
dispue/cases e/ds386_e.htm.).




During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, then-Senators
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton advocated for reform or sus-
pension of NAFTA provisions perceived to be detrimental to
American interests.132 Three years later, this no longer appears to
be a priority.3 3  Notably, the Obama administration recently
moved to fulfill the NAFTA provision allowing Mexican trucks to
travel on U.S. highways, a policy reversal advocated heavily by
the hog industry."
U.S. hog production and pork processing corporations operat-
ing on an industrial scale benefit tremendously from NAFTA.
Domestically, U.S. corporations are confronting more restrictive
environmental standards and increased scrutiny under anti-trust
regulations. Less likely, but still possible, are the concerns that
Congress will address inequitable feed commodity subsidies in the
next Farm Bill, or will revise federal tax policies that incentivize
relocation to Mexico. These realities make international expan-
sion into less-restrictive locales, like Mexico, that much more stra-
tegic. Liberalized trade policies are the cornerstone of these
expansionary efforts, and NAFTA was critical to transforming and
industrializing the Mexican hog and pork markets. Mexico's
traditional hog farmers-and the consumers of their pork prod-
ucts-have fared poorly under this transformation. As such, simi-
larly-positioned countries would be wise to learn from NAFTA's
lesson when seeking trade agreements with the United States.' 5
U.S. exports to Mexico through its Red Meat Regulation "NOM-30" zero tolerance for
salmonella requirements, and by allegedly considering animal welfare requirements).
132. CNN.com, Clinton, Obama Go at it Over Trade, Feb. 25, 2008, http://articles.
cnn.com/2008-02-25/politics/clinton.obama_1_nafta-obama-camp-hillary-clinton?_s=
PM:POLITICS.
133. When Mexican President Felipe Calder6n visited the White House in early
2011, neither he nor President Barack Obama mentioned NAFTA reform in their
public remarks. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, REMARKS BY
PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRESIDENT CALDERON OF MEXICO AT JoINT PRESS CONFERENCE
(2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/03/remarks-
president-obama-and-president-calder-n-mexico-joint-press-confer.
134. National Pork Producers Council Press Release, supra note 128.
135. Carnegie Report, supra note 17, at 6, 8 ("Trade liberalization is facing a crisis
of legitimacy among people around the world, from rural farms in Latin America to
cotton producers in Africa to manufacturing workers in the United States and
Europe.").
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